I read General Tommy Franks' autobiography American Soldier with an open mind. Frankly, I encourage you to read it as a first hand account of how not to lead a military campaign- the book is a must-read for any leader interested in avoiding the same strategic mistakes. And ultimately, it is also a good (though biased) first hand account of the Afghani and Iraqi wars.

It is not that Franks was a maliciously bad leader- he was not. In fact, after reading his book I came away with the impression that Franks is what we would call a soldier’s soldier- he was a solid tactician and innovative combat leader. However, as CENTCOM Commander in Chief, he failed as a strategic leader. The difference between warfighting on the tactical and strategic levels is substantial- tactical leaders fight on a small, violent scale and must be courageous and decisive- strategic officers envision a war’s endstate and must remain patient and open-minded. Franks was not a strategic leader, and his book explains why.

One of the more telling episodes in the book is when he boasts about dismissing the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (he seems to relish the moments he curses out fellow Generals- calling them “Title Ten Motherfuckers”). This immaturity masked in bravado led Franks to failure during the strategic planning phases of the war- he chronicles the dismantling of the Iraq war plans of his predecessor and appeared reticent to fully embrace even Rumsfeld’s vision.

It is remarkable that General Franks so vividly details the actions he took during the pre-war planning and mission execution. It is even more remarkable that he believes his conduct was in keeping with the long line of superb U.S. wartime generals. Upon completion of American Soldier you realize that Franks is not a bad man. He is a strong leader, but a victim to the downfall of many other strong leaders: hubris. General Franks may view himself in the lineage of Eisenhower or Patton; however after putting down his book I view him as a modern day Westmoreland.

As an Army Colonel in 2005, McMaster led a highly-praised campaign which cleared the Tal Afar area of insurgents and succeeded in winning the local population’s support. Earlier in his career, as a Major, McMaster wrote this acclaimed book as his doctoral thesis. The book covers the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President and the decisions that led up to the Vietnam War. The essential premise is that the Joint Chiefs had a moral obligation to inform the President that the war in Vietnam was un-winnable with the amount of troops he was willing to send. None of the Chiefs said so when they testified before Congress, and none resigned in protest. The few members of the cabinet who dared to disagree with President Johnson were quickly fired as an example to the rest.

What is most distressing about this book are the parallels that are there to be drawn. When interviewed in the fall of 2005, Colonel McMaster was asked to draw parallels between Vietnam and the current war in Iraq and said that he wouldn't even go there. I however will:

Like the current Bush administration, loyalty was the virtue Johnson prized above all others. The President would put forth an idea and then ask the Joint Chiefs if it could be done. Once they told him how many troops he would require for that to be successful, he would then authorize a fraction of that number. Whoever objected would be fired. (see also: Eric Shinseki.) The Chiefs, distracted by inter-service rivalry, did not take the moral high road and resign in protest- instead they went along with the President. Appointed by Congress to provide advice and oversight to the President, The Chiefs are military experts. If they were being ignored, and they went along with it, they failed in their duty to the American people, not to mention the 58,000 Americans who were killed in Vietnam.

There is a quote from Paul Fussell (author of The Great War and Modern Memory) on the front of the book that says "The word noble would not be going too far." It is not going too far. The junior officer corps who has served in Iraq is reading this book now, and you should too.

Critics of the Clinton administration often decried America's apparent role as "world policeman", and seemed to promote a more isolationist stance, if not as a facade. No doubt, even as the alleged world policeman of that time, the US had a dubious record, fouling up RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, ignoring the massive Rwandan genocide, and bombing Kosovo.

The Bush administration came to power in 2000 claiming they would not use American power in the way their predecessor had- that is- becoming embroiled in unnecessary military engagements abroad. Of course, 9/11 changed everything, but then the Bush administration changed it again, the takeaway being clear- foreign policy that may seem generous or claim to be (those benevolent police actions) rarely ever is.

Max Boot takes readers on an historical journey from the very first American war expeditions (which were legitimately out of self-defense) through the metamorphosis in which America sought to secure its hemisphere, secure its market share, secure foreign markets to grow, and finally, to secure the American way of life- however you may define it. Sometimes lacking polish, the book is essential to understanding how America skipped colonialism and reinvented imperialism. In between the colorful stories of incredible bravery, you can find both the value of the small war, and the detriment of its legacy.

When they say "they don't make 'em like they used to", they're talking about Smedley Butler. Before retiring as a US Marine Major General in 1931, Butler fought in the Spanish American war, China, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, and was wounded several times. He remains the only US Marine Officer to be awarded two Medals of Honor, and some say he should have received a third, all toll, a staggering record of physical courage and leadership.

After serving as one of the nation's most decorated and loyal warriors, Butler became an outspoken critic of war profiteering and in effect, became a pacifist. He argued that the real cost of war is only known by the soldiers who pay it with their own lives. You will draw many parallels to today's military-industrial complex while reading this short book. You may also consider how a true patriot has his/her country's best interests in mind at all times, and that being a patriot does not necessitate being a hawk, and being a hawk does not a patriot make.

In this masterful reportage and analysis, veteran military correspondent and writer Thomas Ricks deflates excuses about the conception, execution, and leadership of the war in Iraq. The most salient points are found in Ricks' discussion of the Wolfowitz / Rumsfeld development of the Iraq regime change impetus, the infighting between Rumsfeld's DoD and Powell's State Dept as the former repeatedly undercut the latter, CENTCOM's abandonment of former CG Zinni's DESERT CROSSING op-plan to be replaced with Franks' nearsighted warplan, and the utter lack of standards in the treatment of Iraqis during the war, reflected by a huge range of operational and tactical preferences.

This book is highly recommended due to its thorough research, level-headed analysis, and Ricks' sterling reputation.