The military lost another outspoken leader last week when CENTCOM Commander Adm. William Fallon resigned his post due to perceived differences between the Bush administration’s foreign policy and his own strategy for the Middle East.

Much of the row between Bush and Fallon centers on the treatment of Iran- whereas the Bush team continues to play hardball, Fallon (who SECDEF Gates called one of the greatest strategic minds in the military) made the unforgivable mistake of saying that he did not believe war between the two countries was imminent. He also told Al Jazeera last year that the “constant drumbeat of conflict” from Washington was “not helpful and not useful”.

Following his resignation, Adm. Fallon said "I don't believe there have ever been any differences about the objectives of our policy in the Central Command. The simple perception that there is makes it difficult for me to effectively serve America's interests there [at CENTCOM]."

But despite Fallon’s attempt to diffuse the situation, it is apparent that there was a significant difference in the way the civilian policy makers in Washington and military leadership at CENTCOM viewed the Middle East- specifically Iran. This little skirmish brings into sharp focus the civil-military relationship and the responsibilities of both parts to work in tandem to make the best decisions for American foreign policy.


In his Foreign Affairs commentary “Bush and the Generals” (May/June 2007), Michael C. Desch argues that a pre-existing civil-military rift was exacerbated by the meddling of President Bush and his administration in war plans for Afghanistan and the run up to Iraq. Indeed, from Fiasco to Cobra II, from the axing of Shinseki to the retired generals’ revolt, the curtains over the administration’s strained military relations have all but been torn to shreds.

Desch describes how the fracture between civilians in government and our military leadership has quietly festered since Vietnam, but the strategic and tactical mistakes made by civilian leaders in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were not lost on the young military officers of the day. Many, like Powell and Shinseki, resolved themselves at the time to resist when faced with flawed decisions made by civilian leaders. But the question among many military leaders has always been how to most appropriately protest civilian decisions with which they disagree. Moreover, is it even appropriate for military leadership to attempt to affect political policy?

Desch argues effectively that a balance exists when the military maintains control over operational and tactical issues while civilian officials maintain absolute authority over political and strategic decisions. This would suggest Adm. Fallon crossed a line by commenting on potential conflict with an adversarial country. But this line is blurred given that a considerable part of the duties of the CENTCOM commander must be executed as a true military-diplomat charged with maintaining relationships with the heads of state of all the countries in the region.

More pointedly, as a senior military leader and direct advisor to the SECDEF and President, it is Adm. Fallon’s moral obligation to provide unbiased counsel on the view from the ground in an area where he is America’s duty expert and top warrior. In this regard, Fallon was well within bounds to express his opinion. Some may take exception with his doing so in the media, but as they say inside the Beltway, a well placed quote can have greater impact than any meeting. In his defense, he may have been intending to speak to the Iranian people, not Washington. The news media is an efficient but often risky pipeline for an informational operation.


Perhaps Adm. Fallon has a moral objection to the administration’s policy on Iran, or perhaps these are simply “perceptions” and he is resigning having lost the confidence of the administration. I would not at all be surprised to learn that the only legitimate form of dissent available to him was to resign his post, although not doing so in formal protest calls this logic into question. In reality though, the fine line between following your oath to the Constitution and outright insubordination is a tightrope not easily navigated by any military officer.

Is this another incident of a highly politicized administration purging non-converts, or is it the last stand of a military officer unable to subject himself to a policy for which he cannot push the “I believe” button? If the practice of discounting military expertise in the name of civilian oversight endures into the future, the best and brightest of the military will continue to leave the service in protest, formal or not. A balance must be struck to preserve the integrity of American foreign policy and those who help shape it, regardless of whether or not they wear rank on their collars.


Further Reading: Foreign Affairs NY Times BBC