When I ended my active service with the Marine Corps the common joke between my peers and I was, “see you at Spring Break Tehran, 2008.” We were only half serious, but only in as much as we were not sure if we would be there in 2008, or another year. After participating in the buildup to the Iraq war, the Bush Administration’s policy towards Iran for the last two years has felt all too familiar. I, along with many of my fellow junior officers, felt confident that Iran was President Bush’s final objective and that he would not exit office without addressing his ideological battle with force.

As the months wore on, this feeling only compounded among our group—becoming palpable this past August when President Bush designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (an element of the national defense apparatus) a “terrorist group”. This, combined with the Bush Administration’s insistence that Iran was intent on developing nuclear weapons and Bush’s upcoming exit from office in 2009, had all the trappings of a 2003 repeat. I felt so confident in this fact that I actually packed a duffle bag that I keep at the ready in case I am given only 24 hours to report for duty.

As it turns out, I might not need that duffle bag. On 4 Dec, the National Intelligence Estimate downgraded the Iranian nuclear threat, revealing that the Iranians ceased their nuclear weapons program four years ago. This is a major roadblock for the Bush Administration’s fight against “Islamo-facism,” and another blunder in an all too common series of egg-on-the-face moments for our President. But none of this is surprising since our government’s foreign policy seems to be built on finding proof to fit a conclusion and not the other way around. With the release of this new NIE report, Bush finds himself on the defensive once again for his incessant saber rattling. But there are more important takeaways to analyze from this latest revelation—all of which will take some time to digest.

First and foremost, it seems that the U.S. intelligence community learned a great lesson from the Iraq War. Rather then remain content with its current level of intelligence gathering protocols, the authors of the NIE went back to the drawing board and revamped the way it conducts business. They created new procedures and ultimately a report that the American people can be more confident in. Secondly, this could likely be the straw that breaks the Bush Administration’s back when it comes to credibility. It is now more apparent then ever that just because a government official says it on the White House lawn does not mean it is true. Finally, this incident hopefully reveals to everyone that there is a clear distinction between intelligence and propaganda. We relied on propaganda as intelligence once before and are now embroiled in the mess that is Iraq.

I spent Spring Break 2003 in Iraq—but thanks to refinements in the National Intelligence Estimate I may not spend 2008 in Iran. Maybe I’ll unpack that duffel bag.


Further Reading: NY Times Washington Post