For the past three weeks, headlines across the globe have repeatedly screamed “Crisis in Pakistan.” For anyone who follows international news, the fact that there is a crisis in Pakistan is no big surprise. Pakistan is always in crisis and it remains one of the most fractured and disordered countries in the world. It is ranked number 12 on the Foreign Policy magazine Failed States rankings; which makes it slightly more stable than Afghanistan and slightly less stable than North Korea. It is also America’s most important strategic partner in the war on terror.

One of nine states to have the capability to wage nuclear war, Pakistan is also one of only two in the danger zone on the Failed States rankings. It is in America’s best interest to keep a transparent thumb on the Pakistani government so that we do not simultaneously lose the ability to wage war against terrorist elements in the region and allow rogue elements the ability to deploy nuclear weapons.

At the same time, President Musharraf’s recent state of emergency declaration exacerbates a complex and tenuous political climate in Pakistan. Ultimately, the crucial question for America is: how do we best balance the need for reasonable control at the top level of the Pakistani government versus our desire for Pakistan to have a truly westernized democratic government? Can we put aside our ideological desires in the pursuit of pragmatic action? In other words, can we stand to lie with the serpent to behead Satan?

Realistically there is only one safe option: indulge Musharraf and hope that he goes through with his latest pledge to hold elections by January 9th. What other option is there? Pressure him into stepping down and give political power to former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif? Bhutto has proven her penchant for corruption and unwillingness to cooperate unless public perception is on her side. (Read up on her former support of the Taliban.) Meanwhile Sharif is way too close to the Saudis and did little to resolve conflict with India during his tenure.

Despite Musharraf’s many shortcomings, he’s a tough leader- within his own borders he contends with a populace at once both distressed with Pakistan’s cooperation with America and its inability to reign in terrorism inside its own borders. Musharraf may not be a perfect leader or ally, but as former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Anthony Zinni said in the 9 Sep 2007 Washington Post, “We should acknowledge the price the Pakistani military has paid in this battle [against terrorism] and recognize the political courage it took for Musharraf to wage it at all, despite its unpopularity with the many Pakistanis who think that the fight against terrorism is not their struggle and despite the vast array of political, social and security problems his government faces.” We may not like his methods, but pragmatically speaking, Musharraf is our best bet in Pakistan.

Continuing to support Musharraf, however, is not without consequence. Since 9/11, our government has waged ideological war not only on our enemies, but our allies (“with us or against us”) and strived to create a good versus evil paradigm that recalled the fight against the Nazis and fascists of WWII. In recent months, the US has criticized the Russian government for consolidating authoritarian power and the Burmese for shutting down pro-democratic rallies, all in the name of America’s quest to spread freedom and democracy. But what does it say about this ideology if we turn a blind eye to Musharraf, allowing him to continue his dictatorship without penalty, while Pakistanis protest in the streets, demanding actual democracy? The US has painted itself into a corner by espousing fundamentally well intentioned but thoroughly flawed rhetoric, and our duplicitous actions will only serve to embolden extremists to recruit more fighters.

The problem with answering an ideological war cry like jihad with another one (anti “isalmo-fascist”) is that almost no political paradigm can be refined down to something black or white. Until we can get our country away from being ideology and war-centric and back to a nation that uses diplomacy, deterrence, and defense in concert, able to deploy a complex message successfully, we’re going to keep getting blowback for being two-faced in our actions. Assuming this to be a given, therefore, when it comes to Pakistan, we need to focus on the realest threat: nuclear weapons.

During the early 1980s the Reagan Administration turned a blind eye to Iraqi chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. By tacitly approving of Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks, we ultimately emboldened him and nurtured the perception that he would use weapons of mass destruction. This situation ultimately wound itself around to manifest itself once again in 2003 when America chose to invade Iraq, ostensibly to prevent Saddam Hussein from facilitating similar action against the US.

If the US continues to take the easy route and support the lesser of two evils we are we doomed to repeat this same mistake with Pakistan. Do we run the risk of finding ourselves engulfed in another major conflict within the next twenty years because we failed to hold Pakistan to the same ideological standards we hold our enemies? Or is the support of his government an absolutely necessary measure to assure the steadfast prosecution of the war on terror?

These are complex questions without any clear-cut answers. One thing is sure though, just as the streets of Karachi are lined with angry Pakistanis today, they could be lined with American troops in the not too distant future if we fail in Pakistan.


Further Reading: Int'l Herald Tribune Foreign Policy Zinni in the Wash Post CIA World Factbook GWU National Security Archive